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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

SALT LAKE CITY LINES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case
No. 8654

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from an Order of the District Court
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County
denying the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in the
above entitled case and granting the defendant's Motion for a
Summary Judgment of Dismissal.
The appellant raises no procedural question by this appeal
3
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as it is agreed that this was a proper case for summary judgment. All material facts in the case are established by the
pleadings, the only question being a question of law as to
whether the plaintiff's Motion or the defendant's Motion should
have been granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a Utah corporation rendering mass transportation service in Salt Lake City and surrounding area. On
the 12th day of July, 1944, the Public Service Commission
of Utah issued Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No.
640 to the plaintiff, granting to the plaintiff the right to
operate street cars, trolley coaches and motor busses in Salt
Lake City and the surrounding area. A copy of the certificate
was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A and is part of the
record on appeal in this court. Salt Lake City Lines at the
time of issuance of the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity
took over the services that had theretofore been rendered by its
predecessor, Utah Light & Traction Company. In 1946 Salt
Lake City Lines ceased the operation of street cars and trolley
coaches and during the same year removed from the city streets
of Salt Lake City all tracks and trolleys, and since 1947 has
operated solely by the use of motor busses.
On the 25th day of February, 1951, Salt Lake City adopted
an Ordinance which purported to grant a franchise to Salt Lake
City Lines to operate as a common carrier within Salt Lake
City, a copy of this Ordinance is attached to the Complaint
as Exhibit B. Section 8 of this Ordinance provided that as a
consideration for the granting of the franchise, Salt Lake City
4
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Lines should pay to Salt Lake City a tax of 2<f0 upon the gross
revenue of the company obtained within Salt Lake City. Section
10 of the Ordinance provided as follows:
"Salt Lake City Lines shall, within 30 days after the
effective date of this Ordinance, file its acceptance
thereof in writing with the City Recorder of Salt Lake
City, otherwise the same shall be null and void."
Salt Lake City Lines has never at any time filed an acceptance of this Ordinance. Salt Lake City Lines, although it had
never accepted the Ordinance, did pay 2<fo of its gross revenue
derived within Salt Lake City Limits during the years 1951,
1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955. In 1956, Salt Lake City Lines
requested of the City Commission of Salt Lake City that it not
be required to pay the franchise tax. The City Commission
fhereupon adopted an Ordinance reducing the franchise tax
to 1lfo for the year 1956. During the year 1956, Salt Lake
City Lines paid 1<fo of its gross revenue derived within Salt
Lake City to the Salt Lake City government. As of January 1,
1957, the City demanded that Salt Lake City Lines again
resume payment of the tax at 2%.
The gross receipts tax thus established is not applicable
to sight-seeing busses, taxi cabs, intercity busses or any other
type of business enterprise running rubber tired motor vehicles
for hire on the streets of Salt Lake City. By separate Ordinances
the 2lf0 gross receipts tax is applied to the electric utility, the
telephone utility and the natural gas utility rendering service
within Salt Lake City.
Early in the year 1957 the plaintiff instituted this action
for a declaratory judgment, declaring the Ordinance of

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

February ·27, 1951 null and void. Salt Lake City filed an
Answer admitting the facts set forth in the Complaint and
alleging certain additional facts. The plaintiff thereupon filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment and the defendant filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal in its favor.
After hearing oral arguments the defendant's Motion was
granted. No Memorandum Decision was prepared by the
district court so it is impossible for counsel to determine the
exact grounds upon which the order of the court was made.
In seeking a reversal of the judgment of the court below, the
plaintiff and appellant relies upon the following Statement
of Points.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The District Court erred in granting the defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment for the following reasons:

POINT ONE
THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27, 1951 IS NULL
AND VOID UNDER ITS OWN TERMS BECAUSE OF
THE REFUSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE
SAME.
POINT TWO
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT HAS VOLUNTARILY

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MADE PAYMENT OF THE TAXES LEVIED BY SAID
ORDINANCE.
POINT THREE

SECTION 8 OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY
27, 1951 IS VOID AND INEFFECTIVE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-8-80,
U.C.A., 1953 FOR THE REASON THAT THE TAX
LEVIED THEREIN IS NOT UNIFORM IN RESPECT TO
THE CLASS UPON WHICH IT IS IMPOSED.

POINT FOUR

SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER TO LEVY A
TAX UPON THE PLAINTIFF IN CONSIDERATION OF
THE GRANTING OF A FRANCHISE FOR THE REASON
THAT SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER OR
AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH TO EITHER GRANT OR WITHHOLD A FRANCHISE FOR THE BUSINESS CARRIED ON AND CONDUCTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AT AND SINCE THE
TIME OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE OF
FEBRUARY 27, 1951.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE

THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY 27, 1951 IS NULL
AND VOID UNDER ITS OWN TERMS BECAUSE OF
7
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THE REFUSAL OF THE PLAINTIFF TO ACCEPT THE
SAME.
The Ordinance of February 27, 1951 purports to grant
~~ franchise to the plaintiff to engage in the business of rendering mass transportation service within Salt Lake City. The
Ordinance authorizes the company to render service by means
of motor coaches, trolley coaches or street cars. Paragraph 8
of the Ordinance imposes the 2c;'o gross receipts tax as a consideration for t!he granting of the Ordinance. Paragraph 10
of the Ordinance provides that unless it is accepted in writing
by the company within 30 days after enactment, it shall
become null and void. It is admitted by the Answer that the
plaintiff company did not file a written acceptance of the
Ordinance. The reasons that the company did not file the
written acceptance are obvious. In the first place, it did not
want a franchise to operate street cars and trolley coaches
because it had not been operating that type of conveyance for
some four years and had no intention of ever again operating
such conveyances. In t!he second place, under the laws of the
State of Utah, Salt Lake City was without power to either
grant or withhold a franchise to operate motor busses as will
be hereinafter more fully discussed. In the third place, the
company did not want to become subject to the 2c;'o gross
receipts tax. The company not having complied with the
requirements of the franchise ordinance to make it become
operative, the Ordinance falls by its own terms and the lower
court should have declared it null and void because of that fact.

8
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POINT TWO

PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT HAS VOLUNTARILY
MADE PAYMENT OF THE TAXES LEVIED BY SAID
ORDINANCE.
The defendant, while it admits that the plaintiff did not
accept the Ordinance in writing according to the terms thereof,
maintains that the plaintiff is now estopped from attacking
the validity of the Ordinance on two grounds:
A. That it has actually carried on the business of rendering mass transportation in Salt Lake City since the enactment
of the Ordinance; and
B. That it has made payment of the tax provided for in
the Ordinance for a number of years since the enactment of
the Ordinance.
The invalidity of the first basis of estoppel claimed will
be more fully discussed in another section. Suffice it to say
at this point that the plaintiff does not recognize the right of
Salt Lake City to either grant or withhold a franchise to operate
motor busses on the Salt Lake City streets. The power to
either withhold or grant a franchise is vested by the laws of
the State of Utah with the Public Service Commission of Utah.
The acts of the plaintiff in carrying on such business since
February 27, 1951 are not acceptance of the franchise requirements even by implication for the reason that the plaintiff
was doing nothing that it could not have done and would not
have done had the franchise Ordinance never been adopted.

9
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It was carrying on its business of rendering mass transportation
service not pursuant to the Ordinance of February 27, 1951, but
pursuant to Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 640
issued by the Public Service Commission of the State of Utah.
The second ground of estoppel claimed by the defendant
is equally without merit. The fact that the tax has been paid
cannot raise an estoppel. It is fundamental that an estoppel
arises only where one party by the performance of an act has
caused another party to change its position to its detriment in
reliance upon such act.
The following language is found at 19 Am. Jur. page 642
and 643:
"The essential elements of an equitable estoppel as ·
related to the party estopped are: ( 1) Conduct which
amounts to a false representation or concealment of
material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than,
and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; ( 2) intention, or at least
expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by
the other party; ( 3) knowledge, actual or constructive,
qf the real facts. As related to the party claiming the
estoppel, they are: ( 1) Lack of knowledge and of fhe
means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party
estopped; and ( 3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.''
Applying the tests set forth above, let us ask the question,
First: Has Salt Lake City suffered from the act of the plaintiff
in paying the tax? The answer is obviously it has not, it has
benefited. The 2<;'0 gross receipts tax yields a great deal more
revenue than would a tax on the plaintiff company based upon
10
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the same rates of taxation as are applied to other companies
operating rubber-tired motor vehicles on the city streets for
hire. Although this is not part of the record, it was agreed
by counsel at oral argument before the lower court that the
gross receipts tax has yielded Salt Lake City over the period
of years an average of $30,000.00 each year, whereas the
vehicle tax applicable to other rubber-tired motor vehicles, as
applied to the plaintiff's busses, would have yielded only about
$4500.00 per year.
The attention of the court is called to the fact that this
is not an action to recover anything that has been paid in the
past, but merely a petition to have the franchise declared invalid
so that the plaintiff will have to make no payments under
the invalid ordinance from here on. It is quite clear, therefore,
that Salt Lake City has suffered no detriment from the act of the
plaintiff in paying the tax, but has actually benefited to the
extent of approximately $125,000.00. Let us ask again, has
Salt Lake City changed its position prejudicially because of the
voluntary payment of the tax by Salt Lake City Lines. The
answer once again is obviously no. Whatever position Salt
Lake City Lines took in adopting the Ordinance it adopted
prior to the time that the tax became due. It has not changed
its position since that time, but is adhering to the position which
it adopted at the time of the enactment of the Ordinance.
If in fact the Ordinance is invalid and declared so, the city's
power to adopt a new and valid Ordinance is no less today
than it would have been immediately after the enactment of
the Ordinance and before the payment of any money under
the tax was made. There are no elements of estoppel present
11
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in this case and there is no reason why the plaintiff should
not be permitted to attack the validity of the Ordinance today
with the same force and effect that it could have attacked it
on the first day of April, 1951.
This same point was raised before the Supreme Court of
Iowa in the case of Edward J. McKeon et al v. Cit-y of Council
Bluffs, 221 N.W. 351. In 1877 the Missouri River changed
its course cutting off from the City of Council Bluffs an area
of some 1200 acres which had formerly been contiguous to
the balance of the city. Although the cut-off portion, from the
time of the shift of the river on, received no benefits from the
city in the way of police service, fire service, etc. no petition
for severance from the city was made for a period of some
50 years after the change in course. In the late 1920's the
residents of the portion of the city which had been cut off,
petitioned for severance on the ground that their property was
no longer contiguous to the balance of the city and received no
benefits from the city. The city attempted to defend on the
grounds that the residents of this area were estopped from
raising the question of severance because for a period of
50 years following the shift in the course of the river they
had continued to pay taxes levied by the City of Council Bluffs.
In disposing of this question of estoppel the Iowa Supreme
Court stated:
"Equitable estoppel does not arise, in the absence of
reliance and injury. If the adverse party has not acted
to his prejudice, he is in no position to assert an equitable estoppel. Harley v. Merrill Brick Co. 83 Iowa, 73,
48 N.W. 1000; 5 Porn Eq. Jur. 4th ed. Sec. 951; 21 C. J.
1202. * * * No prejudice has resulted to the city of
12
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Council Bluffs from the delay in asking for severance.
The city has during the years subjected the property in
question to municipal taxation without reciprocal benefits. Submission to an inequitable tax for one year can
give no right to the imposition of it the next year. Such
payment of taxes cannot be effectively set up as estoppel. Deiman v. Ft. Madison, 30 Iowa, 542, 550.
"Furthermore, the property owners have had each
and every year the statutory right to severance. The
condition giving them that right was a continuing condition, and the statutory right was a continuing right.
None of the suggested defenses can apply to such a
continuing and ever-existing and present right. Deiman
v. Ft. Madison, 30 Iowa, 542; Smith v. Jefferson, 161
Iowa, 245, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 792, 142 N. W. 220,
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 97; MacGowan v. Gibbon, 94 Neb.
772, 144 N.W. 808."
The defendant has suffered no detriment from the fact
that the plaintiff has voluntarily paid the tax. The company
should not, therefore, be estopped now that it is in financial
straits and has difficulty paying the tax by the fact that during
more affluent years it voluntarily paid the tax illegally imposed
in order to avoid an open breach with the city authorities.

POINT THREE

SECTION 8 OF THE ORDINANCE OF FEBRUARY
27, 1951 IS VOID AND INEFFECTIVE AND IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10-8-80,
U.C.A., 1953 FOR THE REASON THAT THE TAX
LEVIED THEREIN IS NOT UNIFORM IN RESPECT TO
THE CLASS UPON WHICH IT IS IMPOSED.
13
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Section 10-8-80, U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows:
"License fees and taxes.-They may raise revenue
by levying and collecting a license fee or tax on any
business within the limits of the city, and regulate the
same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or town
shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains orders for or
sells goods in such city or town solely for resale; and
no enumeration of powers of cities contained in this
chapter, shall be deemed to limit or restrict the general
grant of authority hereby conferred. All such license
fees and taxes shall be uniform in respect to the class
upon which they are imposed. (Italics added.)
Salt Lake City has made no effort to make the gross
receipts tax applicable to other firms or individuals carrying
on businesses of the same class as that carried on by Salt Lake
City Lines. The tax is not applicable to sigth-seeing busses
which operate mostly within Salt Lake City, it is not applicable
to taxi cabs, nor is it applicable to inter-city buslines which
operate in and through Salt Lake City. These other companies
pay a per vehicle tax which is graded upward according to the
passenger carrying capacity of the ve'hicle in question. This
vehicle tax if applied to Salt Lake City Lines would be but a
small fraction of the amount of the gross receipts tax. The only
other firms to which the gross receipts tax is applicable are the
gas, electric and telephone utilities and certainly Salt Lake
City Lines cannot be classified with these other utilities because,
as is more fully set forth in the next succeeding section, while
the city does have power to franchise the operation of the gas,
electric and telephone utilities in Salt Lake City, it has no such
power in regard to the business carried on and conducted by
Salt Lake City Lines.
14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The necessity that a city license, fee or tax be uniform in
respect to the class upon which it is imposed has been passed
upon by this court a number of times. In the case of Salt
Lake City v. Utah Light & Railway Co., 45 Ut. 50, 142 Pac.
1067, the validity of a Salt Lake City Ordinance establishing
a license tax was challenged. The Ordinance in question imposed a license tax of $1.00 per year per meter on electric
companies furnishing electricity through metered service within the limits of Salt Lake City. The court held this Ordinance
invalid because it applied only to companies furnishing electric
service through meters and not to all companies furnishing
electrical service. In passing upon the validity of this Ordinance, the court stated:
"Uniformity and equality, so far as those elements
can be attained, are always to be the aim and guide
of those upon whom is conferred the authority to impose or assess taxes. When once inequality is permitted,
and it is established that the burden of taxation may
be unequally distributed under governmental authority,
the government permitting it becomes a farce and is
entirely unworthy of either our respect or support. So
long as the burdens of taxation are distributed equally,
they cannot well become oppressive, since they are
imposed upon those constituting the community at large,
and the community as a whole always possesses the
power to relieve itself in one way or another. When,
however, the burdens are imposed upon only a part less
than the majority, or a smaller fraction, the burden may
easily become destructive, and, if not destructive, at
least unjustly oppressive. Equality, therefore, becomes a
safeguard against, if not an absolute prevention of,
excessive and oppressive taxation. Where, however,
those who, for the time being, are intrusted with the
power to pass laws or ordinances by which taxation
15
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may be imposed invade the rule of equality prescribed
by the paramount law, it is the duty of the courts, when
proper application is made, to declare such law or
ordinance void, and thus arrest the evil at its inception.
In doing so the courts are not, as it is sometimes popularly assumed, interfering with the law-making power,
but are merely compelling that power to observe and
obey the paramount law. For the reasons last stated,
we are required to declare the ordinance in question
invalid.''
In the case of Park City v. Daniels, 36 Ut. 554; 149
Pac. 1094, the validity of a tax ordinance was challenged. The
ordinance in question imposed a license fee on peddling or
selling certain designated articles. In declaring the Ordinance
unconstitutional, the court stated:

"It will be observed that subdivision 'a', under which
appellant was convicted, includes all who sell, offer for
sale, or take orders for "fresh meat, or any goods,
wares or merchandise of a general character, or for
teas, coffees, spices, extracts, clothing, dresses, knit
goods or underwear, either with a team or on foot."
These are taxes at the rate of one hundred dollars a
year payable in advance. It will also be noticed that
each and every one of the foregoing articles are not
only perfectly harmless, but are such as are used in all
households, and therefore cannot require special police
protection or regulation. The same may be said with
regard to the articles mentioned in subdivisions 'b' and
'c', with the exception, perhaps, that the articles mentioned in those two subdivisions, or at least some of
them, are not in such constant demand or use as are
those in subdivision 'a'. There is, however, no apparent
reason why a person should be required to pay one
hundred dollars a year in advance for the right to sell
or solicit orders for "fresh meat," while he may sell

16
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all kinds of fish, poultry, and farm and dairy products
for seven dollars and fifty cents a quarter payable
quarterly. Again, why should one person be required
to pay one hundred dollars a year in advance for selling
tea and coffee, while he may sell any one or all of the
other things enumerated in subdivision 'b' by paying
seven dollars and fifty cents four times a year? Is it not
manifest that all those who may sell, offer for sale or
solicit orders, etc., whether for the articles enumerated
in subdivision 'a' or any of them or those mentioned
in the other subdivisions, are all engaged in the same
occupation or calling, namely, selling or soliciting orders
for the sale of articles of ordinary merchandise? Is it
not equally manfest that a person may, with his team
and wagon, sell and deliver quite as much in any given
time of the articles enumerated in subdivision 'b' as he
can of those mentioned in subdivision 'a'? Whether
that be so or not, however, are they not all engaged
in peddling or in attempting to sell, or in selling or
in taking orders for the sale of ordinary articles of
merchandise or household goods ? Again, is it not
patent to all that there is a clear discrimination against
those who may solicit or sell any of the articles mentioned in subdivision 'a' and in favor of t'hose who
may solicit orders for or sell any of the articles
enumerated in the other two subdivisions of the ordinance in question ?

***
While the city authorities of the cities of this state
may impose license or occupation taxes, and for that
purpose may make reasonable classifications, yet the
statute conferring the power (Comp. Laws 1907, section 206, subd. 87) in express terms also provides the
manner of the imposition of such taxes in the following
words:
'All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in
respect to the class upon whic'h they are imposed.'
17
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The very statute, therefore., which grants the power,
also imposes the condition of uniformity. In Salt Lake
City v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah, 38, 95 Pac. 523,
17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 398, we held that it is proper to
classify stocks of merchandise or occupations for the
purpose of arriving at uniformity. In State v. Bayer, 34
Utah, page 266, 97 Pac. 129, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 297,
in referring to statutes imposing such taxes, Mr. Justice
Straup said:
'It is essential, however, to the constitutionality of
such statutes, that the tax apply equally to all persons
of a given class and is uniform and equal.'

We enforced that rule in Salt Lake City v. Utah L.
& Ry. Co., 45 Utah 50, 142 Pac. 1067, where we held

a certain ordinance invalid because it was discriminatory. The rule adopted by this court is the rule that
is generally enforced by the courts of last resort. In
2 McQuillan, Mun. Corps., section 738, the author
states the law upon this subject thus:
'The discriminations which are open to objection
(lack of uniformity) are those where persons engaged in the same business are subject to different
restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.'"
It would be difficult to find an Ordinance which more
clearly violates the requirement of uniformity than does the
Ordinance now being challenged in this action. The Ordinance
is applicable to one company and one company only. Furthermore, even if read in conjunction with other licensing and
taxing ordinances it does not achieve uniformity for the reason
that the basis of the license or tax imposed under this ordinance
is different from those imposed in other ordinances on other
individuals and firms engaged in the business of rendering
18
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transportation to passengers for hire over and through the
streets of Salt Lake City. Applying the test set forth in the case
last cited, all such companies are selling the same thing, transportation. The ordinance is clearly invalid and should be
declared so by this court.

POINT FOUR

SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER TO LEVY A
TAX UPON THE PLAINTIFF IN CONSIDERATION OF
THE GRANTING OF A FRANCHISE FOR THE REASON
THAT SALT LAKE CITY HAS NO POWER OR
AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH TO EITHER GRANT OR WITHHOLD A FRANCHISE FOR THE BUSINESS CARRIED ON AND CONDUCTED BY THE PLAINTIFF AT AND SINCE THE
TIME OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE
OF FEBRUARY 27, 1951.
Salt Lake City apparently relies on an asserted power
to grant a franchise to Salt Lake City Lines as a basis for the
imposition of the gross receipts tax. In argument in the court
below, counsel for Salt Lake City asserted this power to grant
a franchise as a basis for the imposition of the tax on two
separate grounds. First, it was asserted that as the city had
the power to grant or withhold franchises, it could attach such
terms and conditions to the granting or withholding as it saw
fit, including the imposition of the tax. Second, it was asserted
that as the 2lf0 gross receipts tax was, by separate ordinances,
imposed upon the gas, electric and telephone utilities which
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were subject to the franchise requirements of the city, the tax
was uniform on all individuals of a given class, that class
being the individuals or firms subject to the power of the city
to franchise.
Both of these asserted grounds fall, of course, if in fact
Salt Lake City has no power to grant or withhold a franchise
to an individual or firm which carries on a business of transporting passengers by motor bus in mass transportation within
the city. This question is not open to any doubt within the
State of Utah, but has been passed upon by this court. In the
case of Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
118 P (2) 683; 101 Utah 99, decided in 1941, the
court passed squarely upon fhis proposition. In that case,
Utah Light & Traction Co., the predecessor company of Salt
Lake City Lines, was operating as a transporter of persons in
mass transportation within Salt Lake City and between Salt
Lake City and certain adjacent areas. Utah Light & Traction
Co. had a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the
Public Service Commission of Utah. It also had a franchise
from Salt Lake City which at that time it needed because of the
fact that it was rendering transportation service not only by
use of motor coach, but also by use of street cars and trolley
coaches. The Public Service Commission of Utah had also
granted a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to Airway
Motor Coach Lines, Inc. to operate as a common carrier of
passengers between certain communities in the southeast section
of Salt Lake City and downtown Salt Lake City. Airways had
no franchise from the city to conduct that portion of its operation which was conducted within Salt Lake City. Airways used
no street cars nor trolley coaches, but operated entirely by
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use of motor busses just as does Salt Lake City Lines at the
present time. The Supreme Court held that while cities had
the power to grant or withhold franchise to street railways,
to waterworks companies, gas companies, electric light companies, telephone and telegraph companies, etc. that they have
no power to grant to or withhold franchise from motor bus
companies.
The following quoted paragraph states in full the basis
of that opinion by this Court:
"It is evident that the provisions of the subsection
do not apply to certificates such as that here involved,
but only to the classes specified in the subdivision itself.
This is further evident from the fact that a city or
municipal corporation has no power under our statutes
to grant to or require an automobile corporation
(defined in sub-division 12, Section 76-2-1, R.S.U.
1933), to have a local franchise to engage in business
Cities and incorporated towns have no general grant of
power to require or grant franchises. They may grant
franchises to railroads, street railways, tramways, and
union railroad depot companies (Section 15-8-33), to
waterworks companies, gas companies, electric light
and telephone lines (Section 15-8-14); to telegraph and
all wire lines and pole lines (Section 15-8-21) ; to gas,
electric or lighting works (Section 15-8-20). And there
is a special provision as to railroads in Section 77-0-8
The Constitution, Article 12, Section 8, reserves to
cities and incorporated towns the franchise power of
street railway, telegraph, telephone and electric light
companies. These sections cover all the franchise
powers of cities and towns as set forth and granted
by the statutes. That an automobile corporation such
as this is not a street railway was held in Utah Rapid
Transit Co. v. Ogden City et al., 89 Utah 546, 58 P2d.
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See, also, subdivisions 8 and 12 of Section 76-2-1
R.S.U. 1933, defining both terms. As to motor transpor;
companies (automobile corporations), the cities' power
is found in Section 15-8-39, R.S.U. 1933, providing
"they may license, tax and regulate * * * stages and
busses, sight-seeing and touring cars or vehicles, cabs
and taxi-cabs * * * liackmen, draymen, and drivers
of stages, busses, sight-seeing and touring cars, cabs and
taxicabs and other public conveyances. (Italics added.)
There is no power granted to require or grant a franchise for the use of the streets and 'highways for the
purpose of traveling thereon as used by the public
generally. A franchise is the privilege of doing that
which does not belong to the citizens generally by a
common right. 12 R.C.L. p. 174. As to streets, it is
the right to do something in the public highway which
except for the grant would be a trespass. People v.
State Board of Tax Com'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69,
63 L.R.A. 884, 105 Am. St. Rep. 674; 12 R.C.L. p. 175.
Thus the right to lay rail, or pipes, or string wires or
set poles along a public street is not an ordinary business
in which everyone may engage, or a use everyone may
make of the street, but is a special privilege, a franchise
to be granted for the accomplishment of public objects.
They are required only in cases in which it is sought
to impose upon the street a special burden which cannot be imposed generally, that is, to burden the street
with a special privilege which the public generally may
not likewise enjoy. Business such as that of the Airways does not so burden the street_ It uses the streets
only for purposes of travel and transport in the same
manner as the public generally. It is a business not
subject to franchise requirements."
The operations of Salt Lake City Lines at the present time
is in all respects similar to the operation carried on and conducted by Airways in 1941. In fact it is a matter of common
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knowledge, of which t'his court can take judicial notice, that
Salt Lake City Lines acquired the operating rights and properties of Airways in addition to those of Utah Light & Traction
Co. and now operates over the same routes as were operated
by Airways at the time of the above entitled case. Furthermore,
as has been pointed out above, on the routes formerly operated
by Utah Light & Traction Company, Salt Lake City Lines has
removed all rails, overhead trolleys and other equipment which
burden the streets, and operates solely by means of motor busses.
To use the language of this court in the case above cited: "It
uses the streets only for purposes of travel and transport
in the same manner as the public generally."
Certainly if Salt Lake City had no power to grant a franchise to Salt Lake City Lines, it would have no power to
impose a tax in consideration of the purported granting of a
franchise. Likewise, if the city had no power to grant a franchise for this type of operation, it could not meet the requirements of Sec. 10-8-80, U.C.A. 1953 as to uniformity by attempting to group Salt Lake City Lines into classification with other
companies which the city did have the power to franchise. Salt
Lake City Lines cannot be classified with the electric, gas or
telephone utilities. It must be classified with other transport
companies which use the streets in hauling passengers for
hire, and must be taxed on the same basis as such other
companies.

CONCLUSION
It is the position of appellant that the Ordinance of
February 27, 1951 should be declared null and void. First,
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because it never at any time became operative under its own
terms because of the refusal of the plaintiff to accept the
ordinance. Second, the gross receipts tax portion of the ordinance is invalid as it levies a tax which is not uniform in respect
to the class upon which it is imposed. The case should be
remanded to the District Court with directions to vacate the
order of dismissal and to grant the plaintiff's motion for a
summary judgment declaring invalid the Ordinance of February
27, 1951.

Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
721 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
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